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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v. : 
LARRY DEAN COLEMAN, : Case No. 20000626-CA 
Priority No. 15 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
The State appeals from the trial court's final orders-
dismissing the Information charging Larry Dean Coleman [uMr. 
Coleman"] with the operation of a clandestine laboratory, a 
second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-
4(1) (a) and/or (b) (1998);2 possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute, a second degree felony in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iii) (1998) ;3 and possession of 
lA copy of the trial court's "Order of Dismissal," R. 95, is 
attached as Addendum A. 
2Notice was given in the Information that Mr. Coleman was 
subject to the enhanced penalty of a first degree felony pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5(1)(d), (f), and/or (g) because "the 
intended laboratory operation was to, or did, take place within 
500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school; 
and/or the clandestine laboratory operation actually produced an 
amount of a specified controlled substance, to-wit: 
Methamphetamine, and/or the intended laboratory operation was for 
the production of Methamphetamine base." R. 3. 
3
 Although this statute was amended affective 1 May 2000, 
the Information was issued prior to that on 19 October 1999. 
drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998) . 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2) (j) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue; Did the trial court correctly determine that the 
prosecution failed in its affirmative duty to bring Mr. Coleman 
to trial within 120 days after he delivered proper written notice 
of his demand for disposition of pending charges? 
Standard of Review: This issue is subject to a bifurcated review. 
Insofar as it relates to matters of statutory interpretation, 
this court reviews for correctness, "according no particular 
deference to the trial court's interpretation." State v. Lindsay, 
2000 UT App 379, 1J4, 411 Utah Adv. Rep. 41. With regard to the 
trial court's factual findings, such as determinations of whether 
a delay was attributable to the defendant, this court applies "a 
clearly erroneous standard." State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 
1001, 1004 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Therefore we cite to the former version of the statute. See State 
v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, 1|4 n.2, 992 P.2d 986 (" [W] e apply the law 
as it existed at the time of the crime charged.") 
2 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION 
The following statute is determinative of the issue on 
appeal: 
Prisoner's Demand for Disposition, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-
1(1999) 
The full text of this statute is provided in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The chronology of proceedings in this case is as follows: 
28 September 1999 Mr. Coleman is arrested after 
police discover marijuana, 
methamphetamine, and material 
often used to make and package 
drugs in a motel room where he 
is staying. R. 286 [32-36]. 
19 October 1999 
28 October 1999 
29 October 1999 
2 November 1999 
An Information is issued 
charging Mr. Coleman with one 
count of operating a clandestine 
laboratory, one count of 
possession of drugs with the 
intent to distribute, and one 
count of possession of drug 
paraphernalia. R. 3-6. 
Mr. Coleman executes a "Notice 
and Request for Disposition of 
Pending Charges," R. 42, and an 
"Office Memorandum" on the 
subject of "12 0 Day 
Dispositions." R. 45. 
Defense counsel makes a formal 
request for discovery. R. 12-13. 
Roll call is held, and a 
preliminary hearing is scheduled 
3 
f o r November 3 0 t h . R. 285 [2] . 
15 November 1999 Utah State Prison stamps the 
''Notice and Request for 
Disposition of Pending Charges" 
as "Received." R. 42, 289 [32]. 
3 0 November 1999 In proceedings before the court, 
a conflict of interest is noted 
by the Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association, which was 
representing both Mr. Coleman 
and his co-defendant, Ms. 
Coleman. Another roll call is 
scheduled. R. 283 [3-4] . 
6 December 1999 Utah State Prison authorized 
agent acknowledges receipt of 
the "Notice and Request for 
Disposition of Pending Charges 
R. 42. Prosecutor's office 
receives the Notice. R. 289 
[11] . 
21 December 1999 
20 January 2 000 
Upon stipulation of counsel, and 
to allow time to conflict Ms. 
Coleman's case out of the Salt 
Lake Legal Defender's office, 
the preliminary hearing is set 
for January 2 0 th 18-20 
The first pcirt of the 
preliminary hearing is held. It 
is continued until February 24th 
at 9 p.m. R. 286 [6-7, 71] . 
24 February 2 000 The second part of the 
preliminary hearing is held, and 
Mr. Coleman is bound over. R. 
287 [80] . 
20 March 2000 Mr. Coleman is arraigned and 
pleads not guilty. R. 282 [3-5] . 
Defense counsel informs the 
court of its intention to file a 
4 
motion to dismiss on the basis 
of the 120-day disposition, and 
a motion to suppress. Defense 
counsel also requests a trial 
date. R. 282 [5]. The hearing 
date for the motions is set for 
May 15th. R. 282 [8] . 
24 March 2000 Defense counsel's "Memorandum in 
Support of Defendants Motion to 
Dismiss" is filed. R. 39. 
27 March 2000 Defense counsel's "Motion to 
Suppress" and supporting 
memorandum is filed. R. 48, R. 
50. 
Hearing is held on the motions 
to dismiss and suppress. The 
trial court finds there are only 
six days remaining in the 12 0-
day period which the prosecutor 
had to bring Mr. Coleman to 
trial. R. 289 [33]. 
Trial court dismisses the case 
on the grounds that the 
prosecution failed to bring Mr. 
Coleman to trial within 12 0 days 
after receiving notice of 
disposition. R. 95. 
The State filed timely Notice of Appeal in the Utah Supreme 
Court. R. 97. Mr. Coleman filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction,4 and the Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to 
this Court pursuant to Rule 44 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
4
 The Motion to Dismiss and supporting memorandum are 
provided in Addendum C. 
15 May 2000 
23 May 2000 
5 
Procedure.5 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On 28 September 1999 three police officers arrived at room 
310 at a Quality Inn in Sandy with a warrant for the arrest of 
Jamie Coleman ["Ms. Coleman"]. R. 286 [11-12], R. 287 [55-56]. 
They knocked on the door and Ms. Coleman eventually emerged, 
closing the door behind her. R. 287 [56]. A female officer, 
Carrie Geer ["Officer Geer"], informed her that she was under 
arrest. R. 287 [57], Ms. Coleman, who wore only a shirt, said she 
wanted to get dressed. R. 287 [57-58]. Officer Geer assented and 
accompanied her into the motel room. Id. The other two officers 
stood in the doorway. R. 286 [16]. 
Inside the room, Officer Geer saw a "fog at the top of the 
room," and she had a hard time breathing. R. 287 [59]. She also 
saw a package that looked like it contained marijuana. Id. 
Without advising Ms. Coleman of her Miranda rights, Officer Geer 
asked her about the package, and Ms. Coleman replied that it was 
marijuana. Id. Officer Geer also saw material often used to 
package drugs, and ingredients and equipment often used to make 
drugs. R. 287 [60]. She also smelled methamphetamine. R. 287 
5
 The order is provided in Addendum D. 
6 
[71]. She relayed this information to the other officers. R. 287 
[61-62]. 
From the doorway, the officers noticed a man, later 
identified as Mr. Coleman, in the room. R. 286 [18]. One of the 
officers began asking Mr. Coleman questions, and Mr. Coleman 
requested an attorney. R. 286 [18-19]. The police placed him 
under arrest. R. 286 [20]. Soon after, Ms. Coleman gave 
handwritten permission for police to search the room. R. 286 
[23]. The police made a "brief" search of the room. Id. Police 
eventually seized a number of items as evidence. R. 286 [32-34]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The trial court's dismissal of this case for failure to 
bring Mr. Coleman to trial within 120 days after he filed notice 
and demand for 12 0-day disposition should be affirmed. More than 
208 days had passed since Mr. Coleman executed the appropriate 
documents, and the trial court made factual findings that most 
periods of delay in this case were not attributable to Mr. 
Coleman. 
The State argues that three periods of time were 
attributable to Mr. Coleman, and that the 120-day period should 
have been tolled during these periods. The State is correct with 
regard to one three-day period between 27 March 2000 and 30 March 
7 
2000, but failed to marshal the evidence to show that the trial 
court was incorrect in its findings that the 14-day period 
between 16 November 1999 and 3 0 November 1999 and the 23-day 
period between 1 February 2 000 and 24 February 2 000 were not 
attributable to Mr. Coleman. 
The record supports the trial court's findings with regard 
to these two periods of delay. The transcript from the November 
2nd roll call and the discovery request documents indicate that 
the 14-day delay between 16 November 1999 and 3 0 November 1999 
was due to difficulties with obtaining discovery. Additionally, 
the State's argument that the delay is attributable to Mr. 
Coleman because he refrained from waiving his right to a 
preliminary hearing is insupportable. Preliminary hearings are a 
constitutionally-established component of bringing a criminal 
defendant to trial, are normally expected, and do not surprise 
the prosecution with unnecessary delays. 
Additionally, 18 days should be added to this 14-day delay. 
The 12 0-day period commenced when Mr. Coleman executed paperwork 
on October 28th, and the trial court incorrectly gave the benefit 
of the period between October 28th and November 15th to the State. 
Under section 77-29-1, the 120-day period begins when written 
notice is delivered to "the warden, sheriff or custodial officer 
in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same . . . ." Utah 
8 
Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (1999) . Paperwork was executed on October 
28th, and the slowness of the prison administration in processing 
the paperwork does not work to the detriment of Mr. Coleman under 
section 77-29-1. 
With regard to the 23-day delay between 1 February 2000 and 
24 February 2000, the record indicates that the principal reasons 
for this delay were the prosecution's failure to call a necessary 
witness at the preliminary hearing, the judge's scheduling 
conflicts, and the prosecutor's preference for a 9 a.m. hearing, 
as well as the defense counsel's scheduling conflicts. This 
provides ample support for the trial court's factual finding that 
this delay was not attributable to Mr. Coleman, and the State 
failed to marshal the evidence to show that this finding was 
clearly erroneous. 
Finally, the dismissal of all three charges against Mr. 
Coleman should be affirmed because Mr. Coleman gave proper notice 
and request for disposition of all three charges. Mr. Coleman's 
"Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges[]" 
described that there were charges of "Clandestine Lab," R. 42, 
and the accompanying "Office Memorandum" clarified that the 
charges were "Clandestine Lab; Posses [s]ion with Intent to 
Distribute." The "Office Memorandum" also included the case 
number, which referred to all three charges of Operating a 
9 
Clandestine Lab, Possession of a Controlled Substance with the 
Intent to Distribute, and Unlawful Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia. R. 45. Thus, Mr. Coleman gave proper notice of the 
charges pending against him. 
The State's argument, that because section 77-29-1 uses the 
singular term of "charge" each charge must be specified in the 
notice, Aplt. Br. 18, ignores the record and the basic rules of 
statutory construction. The record indicates that Mr. Coleman 
included all three charges in his "Office Memorandum" by 
including the case number and description of the nature of the 
charges. R. 45. Also, the basic rules of statutory construction 
indicate that, besides looking to the plain meaning of words, the 
singular use of words shall include the plural, and the plural 
the singular. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(1) (a) (2000) . Therefore, 
section 77-29-1 must be deemed to apply to "charges" pending 
against a defendant as well as a "charge." Under this 
construction, Mr. Coleman gave more than adequate notice of the 
"nature" of the charges pending against him. 
10 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURTS DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE WAS APPROPRIATE 
WHERE MR, COLEMAN HAD EXECUTED A NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR 12 0 
DAY DISPOSITION 208 DAYS EARLIER, AND THE TRIAL COURT 
CORRECTLY DETERMINED IN FACTUAL FINDINGS THAT MOST TIME 
LAPSES IN THIS CASE WERE NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO MR, COLEMAN 
The State failed to marshal the evidence to show that the 
trial court abused its discretion in finding that several time 
lapses in this case were not attributable to Mr. Coleman.6 With 
regard to the calculation of the 120-day period, the trial court 
made the following findings of fact: 
* The 120-day period began on 16 November 1999. R. 289 [32]. 
On the 15th, the Utah State Prison had stamped the "Notice and 
Request for Disposition of Pending Charges[]" as "received." R. 
42. 
* The period between 30 November 1999 and 21 December 1999 
tolled "because of the conflict with attorneys." R. 289 [33]. On 
30 November 1999 Mr. Coleman's defense counsel had appeared at 
the scheduled preliminary hearing and had requested a continuance 
6
 See State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 929 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994)("If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the 
appellate court assumes that the record supports the findings of 
the trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the 
lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law 
in the case."); Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994)("xIf the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the 
appellate court assumes that the record supports the findings of 
the trial court.'")(citation omitted). 
tl 
because of a conflict of interest regarding the representation of 
Mr. Coleman and his co-defendant, Ms. Coleman. R. 283 [3-5] . 
* The time between 21 December 1999 and 2 0 January 2 0 00 was 
counted "consistent with the State taking responsibility" for 
that time. R. 289 [33]. 
* The time between January 2 0th and March 2 0th was counted. 
The court stated, "it doesn't matter if it's the court or if it's 
the State, it needs to go forward. And there's no reason for me 
not to count those 60 days." Id. The court added later, "the 
court is responsible to move the cases forward too and so I don't 
find any basis for tolling the 120-day period between those two 
dates." R. 289 [35] . 
* The 12 0-day period tolled beginning on the date that Mr. 
Coleman filed the motion to suppress, which the trial court found 
to be March 30th. R. 289 [33]. The court stated, "I find that the 
motion to suppress does stay because that is a defendant's 
choice, and you have a right to have a motion to suppress. 
Because of that, to have that be added to the 120 days doesn't 
make sense." Id. 
* By the time the motion to dismiss hearing was held, 114 
days of the 12 0-day period had elapsed. Id. The court could not 
schedule the trial during the remaining six days, R. 289 [35-36], 
and the prosecutor failed to arrange a date with a different 
12 
trial judge. Therefore, this case was dismissed. R. 95. 
With one three-day exception,7 the State failed to marshal the 
evidence to show that the trial court abused its discretion in 
counting any of the above days towards the 12 0-day period.8 
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes that section 77-29-1 
places the burden of compliance on the prosecutor. State v. 
Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1991); State v. Viles, 702 P.2d 
1175, 1176 (Utah 1985) .9 As the Court explained, "the prosecutor 
7
 As the State pointed out, Aplt Br. 11-12, the trial court 
erroneously stated that the Motion to Suppress was filed 3 0 March 
2000. R. 289 [35]. The motion and supporting memorandum were 
actually filed 27 March 2000. R. 48-55. 
This three-day error is not fatal to the trial court's 
dismissal of this case. The dismissal was signed 9 days after the 
hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, and that places the dismissal 
at precisely 120 days after Mr. Coleman filed his notice of 120-
day disposition. 
8
 A chart is provided in Addendum E comparing the trial 
court's and State's calculation of the 120-day period with Mr. 
Coleman's calculation. 
9
 The statute provides: 
Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment 
in the state prison, jail or other penal or 
correctional institution of this state, and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried 
indictment or information, and the prisoner shall 
deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a 
written demand specifying the nature of the charge, and 
the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled 
to have the charge brought to trial within 12 0 days of 
the date of delivery of written notice. 
13 
has an affirmative duty to have the defendant's matter heard 
within the statutory period. Implicit in this duty is the duty to 
notify the court that a detainer notice has been filed and to 
make a good faith effort to comply with the statute." State v. 
Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 915 (Utah 1998). This Court has also 
acknowledged that it is the prosecutor's duty to ensure that the 
defendant is brought to trial within 120 days after filing a 
notice. State v. Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, \l
 f 411 Utah Adv. Rep. 
41. 
Where a defendant is not brought to trial within the 
proscribed time, "good cause may support the prosecutor's failure 
to comply." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915-16. Good cause is not shown 
where "the prosecutor's failure is inaction," Id. at 916, such as 
"doing nothing whatsoever to bring [the defendant's] case to 
trial within the statutory period." Id. Neither is it shown 
simply by the fact that "the delay was not caused by the 
prosecutor." Petersen, 810 P.2d at 426. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1) (1999) . However, 
After written demand is delivered as required in 
Subsection (1), the prosecuting attorney or the 
defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in open 
court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, 
may be granted any reasonable continuance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (3) (1999) . 
14 
Ultimately, the trial court may find good cause based upon 
its underlying findings of fact with regard to the reason for the 
delay.10 Some facts that have formed a reasonable basis for a 
finding of "good cause" for delay include conflicts of interest 
with the defense counsel where the delay was not prolonged; 
Petersen, 810 P.2d at 426-27; the defendant's request for a 
preliminary hearing after a hearing had already been waived; 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916; illness of the defense counsel; State v. 
Bullock, 699 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1985), and the defendant's 
change of defense counsel along with several requests for 
continuances and an agreement to postpone the trial. 
Phathammavong, 860 P.2d at 1004; State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319, 
1321 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
In reviewing a trial court's dismissal of a case based upon 
the prosecutor's failure to bring an action within 120 days, the 
standard of review is bifurcated. Section 77-29-1 itself 
indicates that, where a motion to dismiss is brought: 
the [trial] court shall review the proceeding. If the 
court finds that the failure of the prosecuting 
attorney to have the matter heard within the time 
required is not supported by good cause, whether a 
previous motion for continuance was made or not, the 
court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice. 
10
 Heaton, 968 P.2d at 916-17; Petersen, 810 P.2d at 427; 
State v. Truiillo, 656 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1982); State v. 
Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
15 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (4) (1999) . The trial court's 
interpretations of this statute are conclusions of law reviewed 
on appeal for correctness. Petersen, 810 P.2d at 425. However, 
the court's underlying factual findings which provide the basis 
for its decision to dismiss a case may be overturned only if they 
are clearly erroneous. Truiillo, 656 P.2d at 405; Phathammavong, 
860 P. 2d at 1004. This is because the trial court is xxin an 
advantaged position to evaluate the evidence and determine the 
facts." State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, 1fl7 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108. 
Findings which are factual include findings about the cause of a 
delay, Truiillo, 656 P.2d at 405/ which party, if any, was at 
fault regarding the delay, Maestas, 815 P.2d at 1321-22; and 
whether the delay was attributable to the defendant. 
Phathammavong, 860 P.2d at 1004; State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 
115, 116-17 (Utah 1982). 
In this case the trial court's underlying factual findings 
are at issue,11 and the State failed to show that these findings 
In its brief, the State characterizes the issue as one of 
law. Aplt. Br. 3-4. However, its argument is directed mainly 
towards the trial court's factual findings regarding whether 
three periods of delay, the 14-day period between 15 November 
1999 and 3 0 November 1999, the 23-day period between 1 February 
200 and 24 February 2000, and the three-day period between 27 
March 2 000 and 3 0 March 2 000 were attributable to Mr. Coleman. 
Aplt. Br. 11-14. Thus, the proper standard of review in this case 
is one of clear error. Pathammavong, 860 P.2d at 1004. 
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were clearly erroneous. The record indicates that the prosecutor 
failed in her "affirmative duty to have the defendant's matter 
heard within the statutory period," Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915 
because she failed to "notify the court that a detainer notice" 
had been filed, Id. and "good cause,"12 such as "a request on the 
part of the defense for a continuance and/or a relatively short 
delay caused by unforeseen problems arising immediately prior to 
trial," Petersen, 810 P.2d at 426, did not support the full 
length of the delay. Because the State has not carried its 
burden, the trial court's dismissal of this case should be 
affirmed. 
A. The Trial Court's Ruling that the Period of Delay Between 16 
November 1999 and 30 November 1999 was not Attributable to 
Mr, Coleman is not Clearly Erroneous 
The State's argument that the period between November 16th 
and November 3 0th was attributable to Mr. Coleman because the 
defense counsel had previously requested a preliminary hearing 
set a month after roll call does not demonstrate that the trial 
court's ruling was clearly erroneous. The State argued, "[a]t a 
12
 See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (1999) ("If the court 
finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the 
matter heard within the time required is not supported by good 
cause, whether a previous motion for continuance was made or not, 
the court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice.") 
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hearing on November 2, defendant not only requested a preliminary 
hearing, but expressly requested that it be set thirty days away, 
instead of allowing it to be set within the ten-day period 
provided by rule 7(g)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure []." 
Aplt. Br. 12 (citation omitted). As a result, the hearing was set 
for November 30th when, "under normal circumstances," it would 
have been set "on or before November 12." Aplt. Br. 12-13. 
Therefore, the State argues, the period between November 15th and 
30th is attributable to Mr. Coleman. Aplt Br. 13. 
Contrary to the State's arguments, the trial court made a 
finding of fact that this period is not attributable to Mr. 
Coleman, R. 289 [32], and expressly rejected the prosecutor's 
argument that the period is attributable to him because of his 
request for a preliminary hearing. R. 289 [34]. In challenging 
this finding, the State failed to marshal the evidence to 
demonstrate that the finding is incorrect. To challenge a finding 
of fact, "an appellant must first marshal all the evidence that 
supports the trial court's findings. . . . After marshaling the 
supportive evidence, the appellant then must show that, even when 
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's ruling, the evidence is insufficient to support the trial 
court's findings." Gamblin, 2000 UT 144, fl7 n.2. The State 
completely failed to do this. Aplt. Br. 12-13. Therefore, the 
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State's argument should not be considered and the trial court's 
finding should be affirmed. Teuscher, 883 P.2d at 929-30. 
Even if the State marshaled the evidence, its argument fails 
because the record supports the trial court's finding. Although 
the defense counsel appeared at roll call on November 2nd and 
requested a preliminary hearing ''approximately a month away," he 
also made a comment, which was mostly inaudible on the 
transcript, regarding discovery. R. 285 [2] . At that time 
discovery had been requested from the State, R. 12-13, but had 
apparently not been received. R. 283 [3], R. 289 [28]. On this 
basis, the trial court's finding that the delay was not 
attributable to Mr. Coleman is supportable.13 
Additionally, a request for a preliminary hearing, which is 
afforded criminal defendants charged with felonies as a matter of 
right, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 13, does not toll the 120-day 
Although the trial court did not state that the delay was 
caused by the State's failure to provide Mr. Coleman with 
discovery, the court found that the delay was not attributable to 
Mr. Coleman. Where "xfactual issues are presented to and must be 
resolved by the trial court but no finding of fact appears in the 
record, we "assume that the trier of [the] facts found them in 
accord with its decision, and we affirm the decision if from the 
evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to support it."'" 
State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1224 (Utah 1997)(quoting State 
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991)(quoting Mower v. 
McCarthy, 245 P.2d 224, 226 (Utah 1952))). 
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period. A preliminary hearing is constitutionally mandated,14 
provided for by Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,15 
and solidly established by case law.16 It is a normal, expected 
component of prosecuting a criminal defendant, and cannot be said 
to surprise the prosecution with extensive delays of time.17 It 
Article 1, section 13 of the Utah Constitution indicates 
that, u [o]ffenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived 
by the accused with the consent of the State, or by indictment, 
with or without such examination and commitment. The formation of 
the grand jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as 
prescribed by the Legislature." Utah Const. Art. 1, Sec. 13. 
15
 Rule 7(g) (1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides that, uIf a defendant is charged with a felony, the 
defendant shall be advised of the right to a preliminary 
examination. If the defendant waives the right to a preliminary 
examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the 
magistrate shall order the defendant bound over to answer in the 
district court." Utah R. Crim. Pro. 7(g) (1) (2001) . 
16
 Case law has long recognized a criminal defendant's right 
to a preliminary hearing. See State v. Ortega, 751 P.2d 1138, 
1139 (Utah 1988)(defendant was denied his right to a preliminary 
hearing where the testimony presented at trial involved a 
criminal episode for which he had not been bound over); State v. 
Jensen, 136 P.2d 949, 954-55 (Utah 1943)(defendant can't be tried 
and convicted on a charge upon which he was not given, or on 
which he did not waive, any preliminary hearing). 
17
 The circumstances here are distinguishable from this in 
State v. Heaton. In Heaton, the Utah Supreme Court found that the 
delay was attributable to the defendant because he had initially 
waived a preliminary hearing. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916. Then, 30 
days later, he changed his mind and requested a preliminary 
hearing. Id. at 913. If he had not changed his mind, the 
defendant would have been brought to trial "just 6 days after his 
written notice had been delivered." Id. at 916. Thus, the delay 
was attributable to the defendant in that case. 
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does not provide "good cause" for "the failure of the prosecuting 
attorney to have the matter heard within the time required . . . 
." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (1999). Even more importantly, it 
does not demonstrate that the trial court's factual finding that 
the period between November 15th and November 3 0th was not 
attributable to Mr. Coleman was clearly erroneous. 
B. Eighteen Days Should be Added to the Trial Courts Original 
Calculation Because the Period of November 15th Through 
November 30th Properly Began on October 28th, When Mr, 
Coleman Executed the 120-Day Disposition Notice 
The trial court's ruling that the 120-day period commenced 
on November 15th was incorrect because the period properly began 
on October 28th, and 18 days should be added to the trial court's 
original calculation. The trial court's explanation for this 
ruling was as follows: 
The defendant filed his 120-day disposition papers on 
October 2 8th. I'm finding that the operative date to 
begin calculating the 12 0-day period is November 16th. 
And that is giving the benefit, frankly, to the state 
prison. Once it's at least logged in to the State, the 
prison records, it's the duty of the prison to move it 
immediately forward. So that's the date I'm starting 
from, between November 16th and November 30th. It's a 
14-day period that is part of the, that I'm calculating 
In this case, Mr. Coleman did not waive his right to a 
preliminary hearing and then later change his mind. He merely 
refrained from waiving his statutory right to a preliminary 
hearing which would have taken place in the absence of 
affirmative waiver. 
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as part of this 120-day period. 
R. 289 [32]. Contrary to this ruling, under the 120-day 
disposition statute the court was not entitled to give the 
benefit of those 18 days to the State, but should have counted 
them as part of the 12 0-day period. 
The statute indicates that the 12 0-day period commences when 
written notice is delivered to "the warden, sheriff or custodial 
officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same . . . 
." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (1999). Further, it is the duty of 
the "warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the 
demand . . ."to "cause the demand to be forwarded by personal 
delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the 
appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-29-1(2) (1999) . 
Here the 12 0-day period commenced on October 2 8th because 
that was date on which Mr. Coleman executed the notice, and the 
evidence supports that he delivered it on that date. R. 42, 45. 
The evidence, fully marshaled in favor of the trial court's 
finding that the 12 0-day period commenced on November 15th, not 
only fails to support the court's finding but supports that Mr. 
Coleman executed and delivered the Notice on October 2 8th. The 
evidence is as follows: 
* Wasatch Records and the Utah State Prison stamped the 
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"Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges []" as 
"Received" on November 15th. R. 42. However, the Notice, along 
with the accompanying paper entitled "Division of Institutional 
Operations Office Memorandum" is dated October 2 8th. 
* "Authorized Agent" Mary Brockbader signed the Notice on 
December 6th, and then prepared the "Certificate of Inmate 
Status" for the "Salt Lake County Attorney." R. 42-44. That day, 
she also wrote a letter indicating Mr. Coleman was filing a 120-
day notice for "untried charges of Clandestine Lab, Poss with 
intent to dist . . . ." R. 46. 
* On December 14th, $5.96 was deducted from Mr. Coleman's 
prison account, as indicated on the "Offender of Account 
Activity." R. 47. 
This evidence indicates that the prison was not punctual in 
processing Mr. Coleman's Notice. The Notice was not signed in by 
an authorized agent and forwarded to the prosecutor and trial 
court until 21 days after it had been stamped "Received." R. 42-
46. Then, the funds for postage and processing were not deducted 
until 8 days after the Notice had been processed and mailed. R. 
47. The most logical inference from this is that the prison 
received Mr. Coleman's Notice on the day he executed it, which 
was October 28th, and, consistent with its later handling of the 
paperwork, was slow to acknowledge it. There is nothing in the 
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record to indicate that the Notice was not delivered on October 
28th, and the trial court itself noted that it was giving the 
benefit of the doubt to the prison. R. 289 [32]. 
Under the 120-day disposition statute, the prison's slowness 
in processing and forwarding paperwork does not work to the 
detriment of Mr. Coleman.18 If it did, paperwork could be kept in 
the prison administration system indefinitely, preventing the 
120-day period from commencing, and thereby rendering the 12 0-day 
detainer statute illusory. Because this statute was enacted to 
"precisely define what is meant by "speedy trial' as that term is 
used in the constitutions of the various states,"19 the 
constitutional right to a speedy trial would be compromised if 
this Court holds that the prison administration may indefinitely 
postpone commencement of the 120-day period by holding up 
paperwork. 
Thus, the 12 0-day period should not have been calculated 
from November 15th, but should have been calculated from October 
28th, when Mr. Coleman executed the proper paperwork. 
18
 Administrative errors are not "good cause" which justify 
the prosecutor's failure to bring a defendant to trial within the 
120-day period. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915 (court clerk's error 
did not constitute "good cause" for the prosecutor's failure to 
bring defendant to trial within 12 0 days.) 
19
 State v. Wilson, 453 P.2d 158, 159 (Utah 1969); accord 
Velasquez, 641 P.2d at 116; Truiillo, 656 P.2d at 404. 
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C. Because the Primary Reason for Continuing the January 20th 
Hearing was the Prosecutor's Failure to Call a Key Witness, 
the Trial Court Correctly Found that the Period Between 1 
February 2000 and 24 February 2000 was not Attributable to 
Mr, Coleman 
The State's argument that the defense counsel's scheduling 
conflict constituted "good cause" for the period of delay between 
1 February 2 000 and 24 February 2 000 does not demonstrate that 
the trial court's contrary finding was clearly erroneous where 
the prosecutor failed to call a key witness at the January 2 0th 
hearing. The State indicates that the preliminary hearing held 
January 20th was "continued for two reasons: 1) the trial judge 
had another commitment that afternoon; and 2) defense counsel 
wanted to subpoena an officer who was not present on that date 
[]." Aplt. Br. 13 (citation omitted). The State argues that the 
date of February 1st was available, but because the defense 
counsel was unavailable on that date, the date of February 24th 
was chosen. Id. Thus, the State argues, 23 days between 1 
February 2000 and 24 February 2 000 should not have been counted 
in the trial court's calculation of the 120-day period. Aplt. Br. 
13-14. 
The State failed to marshal the evidence to show that the 
trial court's finding that this delay was not attributable to Mr. 
Coleman is clearly erroneous, and so this Court should assume 
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that the record supports the court's finding.20 
Additionally, an examination of the record indicates that 
there is ample support for the trial court's finding. At the 
January 20th hearing, the prosecutor failed to present Officer 
Carrie Geer, who made the original entry into the motel room 
where Mr. Coleman was arrested, R. 286 [4-5], R. 287 [57-61], and 
it was this oversight which necessitated a continuance of the 
hearing. Officer Geer first saw a package of what she thought was 
marijuana in the motel room, saw a fog at the top of the room 
that made her eyes and skin burn, and saw ingredients and 
packaging material often used in the production of 
methamphetamine. R. 287 [59-60], Officer Geer told the other 
officers, who were standing in the doorway, that she though there 
was methamphetamine in the room. R. 287 [61]. Because of 
information provided by her, the officers entered the room. Id. 
Ultimately, the room was searched and Mr. Coleman was arrested. 
R. 286 [19-23] . Officer Geer's testimony was therefore necessary 
for the preliminary hearing. 
20
 See Teuscher, 883 P.2d at 929 ("If the appellant fails to 
marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record 
supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review 
of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the 
application of that law in the case."); Wade, 869 P.2d at 12(w'If 
the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court 
assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial 
court.'")(citation omitted). 
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There is no indication that the trial court was prepared to 
bind Mr. Coleman over for trial in the absence of Officer Geer's 
testimony. The court indicated interest in Officer Geer's 
testimony, R. 286 [4, 6], and made no overtures regarding a 
finding of probable cause21 without her testimony. R. 2 86 [4-9, 
71-72]. Thus, the primary reason for the continuance was the 
prosecutor's failure to call this material witness. 
In rescheduling, the defense counsel's unavailability on one 
date does not make Mr. Coleman responsible for a delay which was 
necessitated by the prosecutor's failure to call Officer Geer. 
Even if it did, the trial court's schedule, the prosecutor's 
preference for a 9 a.m. hearing, R. 286 [71], and the defense 
counsel's unavailability on February 1st all contributed to 
rescheduling on February 24th at 9 a.m. The prosecutor had stated 
that she preferred to reschedule a 9 a.m. hearing, R. 286 [71], 
and the defense counsel had said he had a conflict with 
rescheduling on February 1st. Id. Both preferences were taken 
into account in rescheduling. Id. Significantly, the prosecutor, 
who had a duty to inform the trial court of the need for urgency 
21
 Under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(h)(2) a defendant 
may not be bound over unless evidence presented at a preliminary 
hearing establishes "probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed 
it." Utah R.Crim.Proc. 7(h)(2)(2000). 
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due to the notice and demand for 120-day disposition,22 did not 
so inform the court. In these circumstances, the trial court's 
finding that the period between February 1st and February 24th is 
not attributable to Mr. Coleman is not clearly erroneous. 
II BECAUSE MR. COLEMAN GAVE PROPER NOTICE OF HIS DEMAND FOR 
DISPOSITION OF PENDING CHARGES, THE TRIAL COURTIS DISMISSAL 
OF ALL THREE CHARGES IN THIS CASE FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 
WITHIN 120 DAYS WAS NOT PLAIN ERROR 
Mr. Coleman's "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending 
Charges[]," R. 42, and accompanying "Office Memorandum," R. 45, 
properly conformed to the notice requirements of section 77-29-1. 
Under section 77-29-1, the notice must be "a written demand 
specifying the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is 
pending," and it must request "disposition of the pending 
charge." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1999). 
Mr. Coleman's "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending 
Charges[]" stated that he was requesting "final disposition of 
any charge(s) now pending against me in any court in the State of 
Utah. Charges of Clandestine Lab are now pending against me in 
See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915 ("When a prisoner delivers a 
written notice pursuant to the detainer statute, the prosecutor 
has an affirmative duty to have the defendant's matter heard 
within the statutory period. Implicit in this duty is the duty to 
notify the court that a detainer notice has been filed and to 
make a good faith effort to comply with the statute.") 
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the Third District Court, Salt Lake County . . ." R. 42. The 
accompanying "Office Memorandum" clarified that the crimes 
charged were "Clandestine Lab; Posses[s]ion with Intent to 
Distribute," and that the case number was 991920662 FS. R. 45. 
All three charges pending against Mr. Coleman, including 
operation of a clandestine laboratory, possession with intent to 
distribute, and use or possession of drug paraphernalia, were 
charged in the same Information, R. 3-6, and were included in 
case number 991920662 FS. Thus, Mr. Coleman properly gave notice 
and demand of disposition of all three charges that were pending 
against him. 
The State argues, however, that the trial court committed 
plain error in dismissing all three charges pending against Mr. 
Coleman because he "invoked the Statute only as to one charge" 
Aplt. Br. 15. This argument is based on Mr. Coleman's "Notice and 
Request for Disposition of Pending Charges[]," which specifies 
only the charge of "Clandestine Lab." Aplt. Br. 16. The State 
points out that section 77-29-1 uses the singular term of 
"charge" when describing the requirements of the notice, and that 
"strict compliance" with this statute therefore requires 
specification of each charge in the notice. Aplt. Br. 18. 
Therefore, the State argues, "the fact that the defendant 
specified only one of three charges seems to suggest he did not 
29 
care about speedy disposition of the remaining two charges," and 
these charges are still viable. Aplt. Br. 17. 
This argument completely ignores Mr. Coleman's "Office 
Memorandum," attached to his Notice, which described the 
clandestine lab charge, the possession with intent to distribute 
charge, and provided the specific case number, which includes all 
three charges. R. 45. 
The State's argument also ignores basic rules of statutory 
construction. In interpreting statutes, ""[t]his court's primary 
objective . . . is to give effect to the legislature's intent.'" 
State v. Lindsay, 2000 UT. App. 379, % 5, 411 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 
(citation omitted). ""When examining a statute, we look first to 
its plain language as the best indicator of the legislature's 
intent and purpose in passing the statute.'" Id. "Unless a 
literal reading would render the statute's wording unreasonably 
inoperable or confusing, we accord the wording its 'usual and 
accepted meaning' and do not 'look beyond plain and unambiguous 
language to ascertain legislative intent.'" Deland v. Uintah 
County, 945 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Pertinent to this 
case is the rule of construction articulated in Utah Code Ann. § 
68-3-12(1), which states: 
In the construction of these statutes, the following 
general rules shall be observed, unless such 
construction would be inconsistent with the manifest 
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intent of the Legislature or repugnant to the context 
of the statute: (a) The singular number includes the 
plural, and the plural the singular. 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(1) (a) (2000) . Accord Deland, 945 P.2d at 
174. 
With regard to section 77-29-1, Mr. Coleman's ''Notice and 
Disposition of Pending Charges[]" and accompanying "Office 
Memorandum" adequately filled the notice requirements for all 
three charges pending against him. The words used by the statute 
indicate that the "nature of the charge" must be specified. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (1999) . These words do not mean that a 
strict, technically-correct, all-inclusive statement must be made 
regarding the charges. It simply requires that the "nature" of 
the charges be specified. "Nature," used in this context, is 
defined as "the inherent character or basic constitution of a 
person or thing: essence." Merriam-Webster, Inc., Merriam-
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 774 (10th ed. 1997). Here, the 
"nature" of the charges was described by Mr. Coleman in his 
paperwork. 
Additionally, the use of the singular term "charge" in 
section 77-29-1(1) does not indicate a need for more exact 
specificity. With regard to statutory interpretation, "[t]he 
singular number includes the plural and the plural the singular." 
Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(1) (a) (1996)) . Accordingly, 
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this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have often used the phrase 
"charges," and well as "charge," when analyzing section 77-29-
1(1).23 Significantly, in State v. Lindsay, this Court perceived 
that section 77-29-1 contemplates that all charges contained in 
one information are treated together. In holding that a notice of 
120-day disposition is not viable until formal charges are filed 
against a prisoner, this Court said, "[i]t is not appropriate to 
tender a request in anticipation of forthcoming charges, as the 
statute speaks in terms of an untried information Spending 
against the prisoner. '" Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, 1|l0 (emphasis 
added). This is in harmony with this Court's previous observation 
that "an information often must include multiple counts," DeLand, 
945 P.2d at 174, which are treated together.24 Finally, there is 
23
 State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447, 451 (Utah 1987) (holding 
that the notice at issue did "not specify the charges, as 
required by section 77-29-1(1).")(emphasis added); Lindsay, 2000 
UT App 379, K 10 (holding that "formal charges must be pending 
against [a defendant] when the request is delivered. It is not 
appropriate to tender a request in anticipation of forthcoming 
charges . . . .")(emphasis added). 
24
 Rule 9.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides 
that, "[u]nless provided by law, complaints, citations, or 
informations charging multilple offenses, which may include 
violations of state laws, county ordinances, or municipal 
ordinances and arising from a single criminal episode as defined 
by Section 75-1-401, shall be filed in a single court that has 
jurisdiction of the charged offense with the highest possible 
penalty of all the offenses charged." Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5 
(2001) . 
32 
no reason to treat the charges separately in this case, 
particularly where the prosecutor herself did not differentiate 
between them below. R. 56-67. Therefore, the descriptions 
provided by Mr. Coleman of the nature of the charges against him 
are not rendered inadequate on the basis of the use of the 
singular word "charge" in the statute. 
As a final note, the legislature's purpose in enacting this 
statute and its predecessor "was to protect the constitutional 
right of prisoners to a speedy trial and to prevent those charged 
with enforcement of criminal statutes from holding over the head 
of a prisoner undisposed charges against him." Truiillo, 656 P.2d 
4 04. Other statutes enacted for this very purpose have been 
liberally construed in order to effectuate the purpose. For 
instance, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Utah Code Ann. § 
77-29-5(1999), which requires a prisoner to be brought to trial 
within 180 days after the delivery of written notice requesting 
final disposition of the information, is interpreted as requiring 
"substantial" rather than "strict" compliance because of the 
"emphasis on the protection of prisoners' rights . . . ." State 
v. Martin, 765 P.2d 854, 856 (Utah 1988). 
In this case, Mr. Coleman's "Notice and Request for 
Disposition of Pending Charges[]" gave proper notice of all three 
charges under section 77-29-1, but even if it did not, the 
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legislature's intent in enacting section 77-29-1 would not be 
effectuated by reversing the trial court's dismissal of all three 
charges. The charges were all part of the same Information 
specified by the case number in Mr. Coleman's "Office 
Memorandum," and the nature of the charges, which were drug 
charges, was clearly indicated in both the notice and memorandum. 
In these circumstances, a reversal of the trial court's dismissal 
of all three charges would oppose the legislature's intent in 
enacting the statute. 
Therefore, the State's argument that the trial court's 
dismissal of all these charges was plain error fails under the 
first requirement of successfully challenging a ruling under the 
plain error analysis. That requirement is to show that uan error 
exists," State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993), and the 
State did not show that here.25 As a matter of law, the trial 
Because the State's argument fails under the first 
requirement, it is unnecessary to analyze the argument under the 
second and third requirements. However, the State's argument also 
fails under those requirements. 
The second requirement, that the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court, Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208, is not met 
because the three charges were all part of the same information, 
R. 3-6, were included in the case number specified in Mr. 
Coleman's "Office Memorandum," R. 45, were treated together in 
the same preliminary hearing, motions to suppress, and motion to 
dismiss, R. 22-23, 34-35, 39-41, 48-55, and were not ever 
differentiated to the court by either party. Thus, dismissing all 
three charges was not an obvious error. 
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court's dismissal of the three charges against Mr. Coleman should 
be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's dismissal of all three charges pending 
against Mr. Coleman should be affirmed because a total of 13 8 
days not attributable to Mr. Coleman had passed when the trial 
court dismissed the charges on May 23rd.26 This is well beyond the 
12 0-day period which the State had to bring Mr. Coleman to trial, 
and the trial court did not err in dismissing this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <22*J. day of April, 
2001. 
HEATHER JOHNSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JAMES A. VALDEZ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
The third requirement, that the error is harmful and that in 
its absence there is reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the State, Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208, is not met 
because, even if section 77-29-1 is interpreted according to the 
State's argument regarding technical specificity of each 
individual charge, Mr. Coleman met this requirement. He specified 
the case number, which included all of the charges, in his 
paperwork and this provided even more information than the 
required description of the "nature" of the charges. 
26
 See the "120 Day Disposition Calculation Comparison" 
attached in Addendum E. 
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Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, 
and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. 
Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Third Floor, P.O. Box 140854, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this 21AJL day of April, 2001. 
[BATHER JOHNSON H 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney 
General's Office as indicated above this day of April, 2001. 
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ADDENDUM A 
JAMES A. VALDEZ (3308) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 




ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
CaseNo.991920662FS 
JUDGE JUDITH ATHERTON 
Defendant, LARRY COLEMAN, represented by counsel, JAMES A. VALDEZ, having 
motioned this Court to dismiss the Information in the above-entitled case on grounds that 
prosecution of this case is barred under Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1 (1999) (requiring the State to 
bring an incarcerated defendant to trial within 120 days of receiving notice from the defendant 
requesting disposition of pending charges) and the State having failed to so do. 
FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, the above entitled matter is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
Z-3 
DATED ifjisjZ6, day of May 2000. 
v^JUDGE JUDITH ATHERTON 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
00095 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the Brenda Beaton 
Assistant Attorney General acting in behalf of Salt Lake District Attorney, 348 East South 
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this of May, 2000. 
2 00096 
ADDENDUM B 
DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS 77-29-1 
CHAPTER 29 








Prisoner's demand for disposition 
of pending charge — Duties of 
custodial officer — Continuance 
may be granted — Dismissal of 
charge for failure to bring to 
trial. 
Duty of custodial officer to inform 
prisoner of untried indictments 
or informations. 
Chapter inapplicable to incompe-
tent persons. 
Escape of prisoner voids demand. 
Interstate agreement on detainers 









Interstate agreement — "Appro-
priate court" defined. 
Interstate agreement — Duty of 
state agencies and political sub-
divisions to cooperate. 
Interstate agreement — Applica-
tion of habitual criminal law. 
Interstate agreement — Escape of 
prisoner while in temporary 
custody. 
Interstate agreement — Duty of 
warden. 
Interstate agreement — Attorney 
general as administrator and 
information agent. 
77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending 
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continu-
ance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for 
failure to bring to trial. 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state 
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or informa-
tion, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying 
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be 
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, 
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commit-
ment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in 
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any 
reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to 
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that 
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the 
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for 
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with 
prejudice. 
835 
77-29-1 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-1, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Right to speedy trial, 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. Utah Const., Art. I, § 12; § 77-1-6. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Burden of compliance. 
Commencement of period. 
Delay caused by codefendant's action. 
Delay caused by prisoner. 
Dismissal with prejudice. 
Forfeiture. 
Good cause for delay. 
Premature request. 
Prosecutor's delay. 
Showing of prejudice. 
Standard of review. 
Warden's delay. 
Written demand. 
Burden of compliance. 
The language of Subsection (4) clearly places 
the burden of complying with the statute on the 
prosecutor. State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 
(Utah 1991). 
The trial court erred in concluding that de-
fendant was in the same position as was the 
state and therefore shared some of the respon-
sibility to find out why his case had not been set 
for trial. State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 
1998). 
The trial court erred in concluding that a 
delay caused by the court clerk's error consti-
tuted "good cause" and thereby relieved the 
prosecutor of its burden under this section. 
State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998). 
Commencement of period. 
Ninety-day period for prosecution under 
former § 77-65-1 commenced on the day defen-
dant notified county attorney of his request for 
final disposition of case or cases pending 
against him; and the filing of a complaint, 
information or indictment did not affect the 
commencement of the period. State v. Moore, 
521 P.2d 556 (Utah 1974). 
Motion to dismiss charges against defendant 
who was brought to trial 92 days after warden 
received notice of his request for final disposi-
tion of pending charges was properly denied 
since computation of then 90-day time period 
commenced from date that notice was delivered 
to county attorney and appropriate court. State 
v. Taylor, 538 P.2d 310 (Utah 1975). 
Delay caused by codefendant's action. 
Defendant was not entitled to a dismissal of 
the charges where the trial was delayed beyond 
the 120-day time period, and the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in finding that there 
was good cause for the delay, where the delay 
was reasonable and not the result of the pros-
ecution's actions or inactions, but was due to a 
codefendant, who was to be jointly tried with 
defendant and who was expected to plead guilty 
at trial as the result of plea negotiations, 
changing his plea to not guilty on the scheduled 
trial date. State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d 403 (Utah 
1982). 
Delay caused by prisoner. 
Where statute provided that prisoner be 
brought to trial within ninety days of his re-
quest for disposition of pending charges, the 
ninety-day disposition period was to be ex-
tended! by the amount of time during which 
defendant himself created delay. State v. 
Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115 (Utah 1982). 
When a defendant causes a trial to be de-
layed, he temporarily waives the right to a 
speedy trial. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 
(Utah 1986); State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 
(Utah 1991); State v. Sioudonne Phatham-
mavong, 860 P2d 1001 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Becaiuse defendant's own actions m request-
ing continuances, changing counsel, and agree-
ing to postpone trial until after disposition of 
pretrial motions were the main cause of delay 
and because defendant failed to show any 
prejudice caused by the delay, he was not de-
nied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. 
State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
Dismissal with prejudice. 
Defendant's convictions were reversed and 
the charges against him dismissed with preju-
dice, where the trial date was set for 218 days 
beyond the time defendant filed the notice of 
disposition, and the trial court's finding of good 
cause could not be supported by a conclusion 
that the delay was for the purpose of allowing 
time for defendant and his counsel to resolve 
their conflicts. State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 
(Utah L991). 
Forfeiture. 
Defendant did not forfeit his right to have 
charges against him dismissed by remaining 
silent and failing to request an earlier setting 
when trial court set date for trial beyond 
ninety-day period required under former § 77-
65-1; burden of complying with statute rested 
on prosecutor. State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 
453 P.2d 158 (1969). 
Good cause for delay. 
Where defendant's trial date was originally 




JAMES A. VALDEZ 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-5444 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
REQUEST TO STAY BRIEFING 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
V. : 
LARRY DEAN COLEMAN, t Case No. 20000626-SC 
Priority No. 15 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
COMES NOW Defendant/Appellee Larry Dean Coleman, by and 
through counsel, Heather Johnson, and respectfully submits this 
motion to dismiss on the grounds that this Court lacks original 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3) (j) (1996) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1996) . 
Appellee further requests that this Court stay the briefing 
schedule pending resolution of this motion. Appellant, the State 
of Utah, filed its opening brief in this Court on 29 December 
2000; Appellee's brief is currently due on 27 February 2001. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JlH. day of February, 
2001. s 
HEATHER JO&JSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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HEATHER JOHNSON 
JAMES A. VALDEZ 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-5444 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
LARRY DEAN COLEMAN, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
REQUEST TO STAY BRIEFING 
Case No. 20000626-SC 
Priority No. 15 
STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Defendant/Appellee Larry Dean Coleman ["Mr. Coleman"], by 
and through counsel, Heather Johnson, hereby submits this 
memorandum in support of Appellee's motion to dismiss and request 
to stay briefing. Mr. Coleman respectfully requests this Court to 
dismiss the above-entitled action on the grounds that this Court 
lacks original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3) (j) (1996) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) . 
Mr. Coleman further requests that this Court stay the briefing 
schedule pending resolution of this motion. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Mr. Coleman was arrested on 28 September 1999 and later 
charged by Information with the operation of a clandestine 
laboratory, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37d-4(l) (a) and/or (b) (1998);x possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 48-37-8(1) (a) (iii) (1998) ; and 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(1998). R. 3-4. After these 
charges were filed, Mr. Coleman, who was incarcerated at the Utah 
State Prison, R. 46, executed a "Notice and Request for 
Disposition of Pending Charge[s]." R. 42. This Request was dated 
28 October 1999, and was stamped "received" by the Wasatch 
Records Division at the Utah State Prison in November. R. 42. 
Mary Brockbrader, an authorized agent in the Record Unit at the 
Utah State Prison, certified her receipt of the Request on 6 
December 1999. R. 42. 
A preliminary hearing was held 20 January 2000 and continued 
until 24 February 2000. R. 21-35. Thereafter, Mr. Coleman was 
1
 Notice was given in the Information that Mr. Coleman was 
subject to the enhanced penalty of a first degree felony pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5(1) (d), (f) , and/or (g) because "the 
intended laboratory operation was to, or did, take place within 
500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school; 
and/or the clandestine laboratory operation actually produced an 
amount of a specified controlled substance . . ., and/or the 
intended laboratory operation was for the production of 
Methamphetamine base." R. 3. 
2 
bound over for arraignment. R. 35. In March, Mr. Coleman 
indicated his intent to file a motion to suppress evidence and a 
motion to dismiss the charges due to the State's failure to 
prosecute within 120 days after receiving the Request for 
Disposition. R. 282 [5-7] . Hearings on these motions were held in 
May. R. 288, 289. The trial court dismissed2 the charges in the 
Information on 23 May 2000 due to the State's failure to bring 
Mr. Coleman to trial within 120 days after receiving a Request 
for Disposition. R. 95.3 The State filed a notice of appeal to 
this Court on 20 June 2000. R. 97. 
2A copy of the trial court's "Order of Dismissal," R. 95, is 
attached as Addendum A. 
3
 The dismissal was pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-
1(1) (1999) ("Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment 
in the state prison, jail or other penal or correctional 
institution of this state, and there is pending against the 
prisoner in the state any untried indictment or information, and 
the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial 
officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a 
written demand specifying the nature of the charge and the court 
wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the pending 
charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge brought to trial 
within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.") 
3 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ORIGINAL APPELLATE 
JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
2a-3(2) (e) (1996), SECTION 78-2-2(3) (j), WHICH PROVIDES THIS 
COURT WITH JURISDICTION WHERE THE COURT OF APPEALS "DOES NOT 
HAVE ORIGINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION/' DOES NOT APPLY 
The Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction in 
this case because this is a criminal case appealed from the trial 
court's final judgment of dismissal due to the State's failure to 
bring Mr. Coleman to trial within 120 days after receiving a 
Request for Disposition, R. 95. Section 78-2a-3 of the Utah Code 
indicates that n[t]he Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction 
. . . over: (e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital 
felony . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) .4 This statute 
confers original appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals 
in this case because: 
(1) The third judicial district court, from which this appeal 
originates, is a court of record. State v. Fisk, 966 P.2d 860, 
863 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
(2) This is a criminal case. R. 3-6. 
(3) This case does not involve a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony. Mr. Coleman did not plead guilty to the charges, 
4The full text of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(1996) is attached 
as Addendum B. 
4 
R. 36-37, and he was not ever brought to trial and found guilty 
because the trial court dismissed the case based on the State's 
failure to bring Mr. Coleman to trial within 120 days after 
receiving a Request for Disposition. R. 95.s 
Thus, the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) . 
Additionally, neither the docketing statement6 nor the 
opening brief filed by the State provide jurisdictional authority 
for this Court to hear this appeal. In its docketing statement, 
filed 11 July 2000, the State cites to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-
1(2) (a) (1999)7 and § 78-2-2(3) (i) (1996) in support of its 
5
 Additionally, this case arguably does not even involve a 
first degree or capital felony. The Information charged Mr. 
Coleman with two second degree felonies and a class B 
misdemeanor. R. 3-6. 
Notice was given in the Information that Mr. Coleman was 
subject to the enhanced penalty of a first degree felony pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5 (1) (d) , (f) , and/or (g) . R. 3. 
However, because this case did not proceed further, that 
enhancement was not invoked. 
6
 The appropriate subsection granting jurisdiction to the 
Utah Supreme Court must be cited in the docketing statement to 
alert the Court that it has original appellate jurisdiction over 
the case. Gregory v. Fourthwest Invs., Ltd., 735 P. 2d 33, 34 
(Utah 1987) . 
7
 The State actually cites to the 1998 supplement of section 
77-18a-l(2) (a). However, because the 1999 edition is identical to 
the 1998 supplement, Mr. Coleman cites to the more recent 1999 
edition. 
5 
assertion that this Court has jurisdiction in this case- However, 
section 77-18a-l(2)(a) simply grants the prosecution authority to 
appeal from final judgments of dismissal.8 Section 78-2-2(3) (i) 
states that this Court has jurisdiction over "appeals from the 
district court involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) (1996) . Because 
this case does not involve a conviction for a first degree or 
capital felony, R. 36-37, 95, section 78-2-2(3)(i) does not 
provide this Court with jurisdiction. 
In its opening brief, the State cites Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3) (j) (1996) in stating that this Court has jurisdiction to hear 
this appeal. Aplt. Br. 3. That section indicates that n[t]he 
Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction . . . over: (j) orders, 
judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction . 
. ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1996) .9 However, because the 
Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction in this 
case, section 78-2-2(3) (j) does not provide jurisdiction for this 
Section 77-18a-l(2)(a) states that the prosecution may 
appeal from ua final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal 
of a felony information following a refusal to bind the defendant 
over for trial." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2) (a) (1999) . 
9
 The full text of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(1996) is attached 
as Addendum C. 
6 
Court. 
In light of the above, briefing in this case should be 
stayed and this case should be dismissed from this Court-10 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /IrtL day of February, 
2001. 
>K-C 
ENSON HEATHER JOI 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
10
 This motion should not be denied on the basis that this 
case has already been opened and the State has already filed its 
initial brief. "Whether by [discovery of the court] or by motion 
of a party, dismissal for lack of jurisdiction will be considered 
at any stage of the proceedings when it appears that jurisdiction 
is, in fact, lacking." Silva v. Department of Employment 
Security, 786 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Further, Mt]he 
parties cannot by their silent acquiescence invest jurisdiction 
upon this court when the requisite elements are absent." Id. 
7 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, HEATHER JOHNSON, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
hand-delivered the original and four copies of Appellee's "Motion 
to Dismiss and Request to Stay Briefing" and Appellee's 
"Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and Request to Stay 
Briefing" to the Utah Supreme Court, 450 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and one copy to the Utah Attorney 
Generalfs Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 
Third Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, 
this Ix-tiL day of February, 2001. 
^ E & e ^ 
THER J0HNSON 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney 





UTAH SUPREME COURT 
MAR 2 1 2001 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH PAT BARTHOLOMEW 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, No. 20000626 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Larry Dean Coleman, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
ORDER 
Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied, and this case is 
transferred to the court of appeals under Utah R. App. P. 44. 
FOR THE COURT: 
^H&r&isJJ, £ P&I /rWt*G+s*H, ^ wt (Cyt^'frfc *. 
Date Rrchard C. Howe, 
Chief Justice 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on March 21, 2001, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was 
deposited in the United States mail to the parties listed below: 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
BRENDA J. BEATON 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160E300S6THFLR 
PO BOX 140856 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0856 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ROOM 236 
JAMES A. VALDEZ 
HEATHER JOHNSON 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424E500SSTE300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the trial court listed below: 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: SUZY CARLSON 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
Dated this March 21, 2001. 
Deputy Clerk » 
Case No 20000626 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE , 991920662 
ADDENDUM E 
12 0 DAY DISPOSITION 
CALCULATION COMPARISONS 













3 0 days 
1/20/00: 
1st part of Prelim. 
12 days 
2/1/00: 
Possible Sched. Date 
23 days 
2/24/00: 






Motion to Dismiss 
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TOTAL DAYS PASSED: 123 138 
